The Political Power of TV Broadcasters: Covert Bias and Anticipated Reactions

James H. Snider and Benjamin I. Page

IPR working papers from Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University

Abstract: Democratic theory suggests that media should act in the interests of ordinary citizens. If a highly influential segment of the media presents information in a way that systematically favors its interests over other interests, democracy may be weakened. Media organizations, reacting to concern about such "bias," often insist that they follow a "norm of objectivity," separating their business interests from their news operations. Media scholars tend to confirm that such a norm of objectivity pervades newsrooms. On February 1, 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, one provision of which gave existing TV broadcasters free usage of spectrum valued at between $11 billion and $70 billion. Opponents called this a "giveaway" and one of the largest "corporate welfare" programs in United States history. In the months preceding and following passage of the act, TV broadcasters actively lobbied against their opponents. The research here suggests that the separation of "church and state" was crossed; media owners used their control of the airwaves to enhance their efforts at lobbying elected officials. The research also suggests that media scholars may have tended to conceptualize the mechanisms of media bias too narrowly. More emphasis should be placed on "covert bias" and "anticipated reactions."

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