Implementing Coordinated Team Play

Anil Arya (), Jonathan Glover and John S. Hughes

Corporate Finance & Organizations from Ohio State University

Abstract: This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting is simple. A key aspect of the mechanism is the use of at- will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time.

References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/dept/acctmis/fac/arya/work/irjet.doc (application/msword)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/dept/acctmis/fac/arya/work/irjet.doc [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/dept/acctmis/fac/arya/work/irjet.doc [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://fisher.osu.edu/dept/acctmis/fac/arya/work/irjet.doc)

Related works:
Journal Article: Implementing Coordinated Team Play (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:ohstfi:_006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Corporate Finance & Organizations from Ohio State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().