Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective

George Mailath and Stephen Morris

CARESS Working Papres from University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences

Abstract: In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals. We present three new observations. First, in a simple twice repeated game, we characterize the private signalling technologies that allow non-static Nash behavior in pure strategy equilibria. Our characterization uses the language of common p-belief due to Monderer and Samet (GEB, 1989). Second, we show that in the continuum action convention game of Shin and Williamson (GEB, 1996), for any full support private monitoring technology, equilibria of the finitely repeated convention game must involve only static Nash equilibria. By contrast, with sufficiently informative public monitoring, the multiplicity of Nash equilibria allows a finite folk theorem. Finally, for finite action games, we prove that there are full support private monitoring technologies for which a Nash reversion infinite horizon folk theorem holds.

Date: 1998-07-03
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Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective'
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