Risk-Taking Behavior with Limited Liability and Risk Aversion

Christian Gollier (), Pierre-François Koehl and Jean Rochet

Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers from Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: The authors of this paper consider the problem of a risk-averse firm with limited liability. The firm has to select the size of its investment in a risky project. We show that the optimal exposure to risk of the limited liability firm is always larger than under full liability. Moreover, there exists a positive lower bound on the value of the firm below which the firm will "bet for resurrection," i.e. it will invest the largest positive amount in the risky project. We also consider the standard portfolio problem with more than one risky asset. We show that limited liability may induce the firm to specialize in no Mean-Variance efficient assets.

This paper was presented at the Financial Institutions Center's May 1996 conference on "

Date: 1996-05
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