The Propagation of Cooperation in a Model of Learning with Endogenous Aspirations

Paolo Lupi

Research in Economics from Santa Fe Institute

Abstract: In this paper we build a spatial, aspiration-based model of learning in the context of Cournot oligopoly from which we want to explore the conditions that lead to the emergence of cooperation among firms. We consider an economy consisting of many identical duopolies; each duopoly is placed on a square of a torus. The duopolists are boundedly rational agents which adopt a very simple behavioral rule: if they are earning at least average profits, they do not change their strategies; if they are earning below-average profits they imitate the strategy adopted by one of their neighbors. We consider many variations to this simple setup and, in almost all cases, as in Dixon (1998) and Dixon and Lupi (1997) we get results that support cooperation among firms.

Date: 1998-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/98-06-052E.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/98-06-052E.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/98-06-052E.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:safire:98-06-052e

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research in Economics from Santa Fe Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().