Inequality and Redistribution in Multiple Dimensions

Francisco Rodríguez

Research in Economics from Santa Fe Institute

Abstract: A three-class game of redistribution without a pure strategy equilibrium is studied under a model of adaptive politicians. This model allows us to integrate one person - one vote models of redistribution with the models which emphasize political influence so as to study when different social classes will form coalitions against each other and what types of redistributive policies are likely to emerge from that interaction. For a wide range of parameter specifications, we find that inequality is negatively related to redistribution.

Date: 1998-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/98-06-054E.ps (application/postscript)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/98-06-054E.ps [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/98-06-054E.ps)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:safire:98-06-054e

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research in Economics from Santa Fe Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().