Comparing Competition and Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Numerical Approach

Patrick Bajari

Working Papers from Stanford University, Department of Economics

Abstract: January 2000, Revised January 2001

Collusion is a serious problem in many procurement auctions. In this research, I study a model of first price sealed bid procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders. I demonstrate that the equilibrium to the model is unique and describe three algorithms that can be used to compute the inverse equilibrium bid functions. I then use the computational algorithms to compare competitive and collusive bidding. The algorithms are useful for structural estimation of auction models and for assessing the damages from bid-rigging.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp00003.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp00003.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp00003.pdf [307 Temporary Redirect]--> https://economics.stanford.edu//faculty/workp/swp00003.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:stanec:00003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Stanford University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().