Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate

Peter Hammond

Working Papers from Stanford University, Department of Economics

Abstract: August 1999

For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in continuum economies, agents cannot influence prices strategically. Or the results concern social choice with a variable number of agents. This paper considers allocations granting agents equal rights to choose net trade vectors within a convex cone and, in order to exclude autarky, an additional right to mediate mutually beneficial transactions. Under standard assumptions, these properties characterize Walrasian equilibria without transfers.

JEL: Classifications: D63, D50

Date: 1999-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Equal rights to trade and mediate (2003)
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