ABSTRACT OF CONTRACTING FOR NON-POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT

Olof Bystrom () and Daniel Bromley

No 392, Staff Papers from University of Wisconsin Madison, AAE

Abstract: This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country's government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other's environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority as a solution to the domestic pollution problem. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. To solve the international problem of pollution management of a common (water) resource, we propose an international agency with authority to write and enforce contracts in each of its member countries. We show that the information requirement on a country's government can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made non-individual.

Date: 1996-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:wiaesp:392

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