A Collective Tournament

Robert W Drago (), Gerald T. Garvey and Geoffrey K. Turnbull
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Robert W Drago: University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

Working papers from University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

Abstract: Traditional tournaments among workers yield suboptimal levels of helping efforts, while collective incentives generate free-riding or lack incentive compatibility. We confront these problems using a tournament between workplaces. Under fairly restrictive conditions, the tournament is first-best and incentive compatible.

JEL-codes: D2 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Forthcoming Economics Letters

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