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Organization, Learning and Cooperation

Jason Barr and Francesco Saraceno

Computational Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival's output. We show how a firm's profit and cooperation rates are affected by its size, its rival's size and willingness to cooperate and environmental complexity.

Keywords: Artificial Neural Networks; Cooperation; Firm Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 D21 D83 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2004-02-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Organization, learning and cooperation (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Organization, learning and cooperation (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Organization, learning and cooperation (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Organization, Learning and Cooperation (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Organization, Learning and Cooperation (2004) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:0402001

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