Political Competition in Economic Perspective

Pranab Bardhan and Tsung-Tao Yang
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Tsung-Tao Yang: University of California, Berkeley

Development and Comp Systems from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It is sometimes argued that political competition yields benefits to the citizens just as competition in economic markets yields benefits to consumers. We consider the economic costs and benefits of political competition and find that the story is somewhat more complicated. We first review the limited existing literature on this topic, and in the process, identify a number of distinct interpretations of what constitutes political competition. We then turn our attention to two forms of political competition based on what we refer to as accountability for incumbents and electoral politics. We find that, while political competition can yield allocative benefits for the public, it can also generate aggregate welfare costs by constricting the set of politically feasible public investments.

JEL-codes: O1 P11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2004-07-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: 35 pages, Acrobat .pdf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Competition in Economic Perspective (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0407009

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