Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game

Eduardo Ley

Econometrics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, and shows that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher, with preferences represented by the prior, and the data, with preferences represented by the likelihood.

Keywords: Social Welfare Function; Social Information Function; Contract Curve; Nash bargaining solution; Bayesian Inference; Posterior Mode (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C11 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-05, Revised 2006-01-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Forthcoming in Economics Letters.
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Related works:
Journal Article: Statistical inference as a bargaining game (2006)
Working Paper: Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpem:0110001

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