Transport contract optimization under information asymmetry: an example
Xavier Brusset () and
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Nico Temme: Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Econometrics from University Library of Munich, Germany
The present paper shows why information asymmetry and bivariate stochastic demand and spot price induce different behaviours and economic inefficiency in a carrier – shipper relationship. An example is offered of a single period, single echelon, shipper-carrier transport model where demand addressed to the shipper and the spot transport price, two exogenous stochastic variables, follow a bivariate exponential probability distribution function. We evaluate the objective functions of the carrier and shipper over one period reiterated with a mix of long-term and short-term procurement strategies under five scenarios of information sharing. Some clues as to ways of solving for other types of bivariates are provided.
Keywords: supply chain management; coordination; information sharing; decision anylisis; bivariate statistics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C61 L14 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30. A discussion of game theoretic behaviour of a transport service provider and a shipper when demand and price of transport can vary dependently.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpem:0512005
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