Economics at your fingertips  

Transport contract optimization under information asymmetry: an example

Xavier Brusset () and Nico Temme
Additional contact information
Nico Temme: Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Econometrics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The present paper shows why information asymmetry and bivariate stochastic demand and spot price induce different behaviours and economic inefficiency in a carrier – shipper relationship. An example is offered of a single period, single echelon, shipper-carrier transport model where demand addressed to the shipper and the spot transport price, two exogenous stochastic variables, follow a bivariate exponential probability distribution function. We evaluate the objective functions of the carrier and shipper over one period reiterated with a mix of long-term and short-term procurement strategies under five scenarios of information sharing. Some clues as to ways of solving for other types of bivariates are provided.

Keywords: supply chain management; coordination; information sharing; decision anylisis; bivariate statistics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C61 L14 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2005-12-07
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30. A discussion of game theoretic behaviour of a transport service provider and a shipper when demand and price of transport can vary dependently.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometrics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().

Page updated 2020-03-29
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpem:0512005