Strengths of the Weakest-Link

Philippe Février (), Laurent Linnemer and )

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The "Weakest Link" is a game show full of paradox. To increase the probability of winning, contestants should eliminate the strongest players. Yet, if it is anticipated that the best player is to be eliminated, participants do not answer questions correctly and nothing is gained. We solve a game that illustrates the Weakest Link tradeoffs and show that two equilibria coexist: an equilibrium in which players remain silent and a more entertaining equilibrium in which they give good answers whenever they can. We study the first wave of the Weakest Link show broadcast in France. Contestants vote against the weakest player and answer truthfully to the questions. They exhibit, however, myopic behavior as they do not use all the available information. The selection of one equilibrium or the other relies on how players coordinate in voting subgames. Three arguments are provided to explain observed behavior: Pareto domination, risk domination, and the "mise en scène" of the show.

Keywords: Coordination; Pareto and risk domination; vote; game show; eld experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 D72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2002-10-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on pc; pages: 45; figures: 3
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/exp/papers/0210/0210002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strengths of the "Weakest Link"? (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0210002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).