Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Business-to-Business Matching Markets

Ernan Haruvy and Utku Unver

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A two-sided matching framework is applied to repeated business-to- business procurement matches. Both static and dynamic solutions concepts--- namely Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, learning dynamics, and genetic algorithms--- are used to obtain solutions. The settings under investigation include both full information and limited information settings. We show that under certain conditions the dynamic predictions refine the core of the matching market. According to the theoretical predictions, organizational buyers would be better off in buyer-proposing settings than in seller-proposing settings, whereas sellers would prefer the opposite. The salience of this theoretical prediction is tested and confirmed using experimental data under different environments.

JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05-14, Revised 2004-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: Type of Document - PDF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0305004

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