Hide and Seek in Arizona

Robert Rosenthal, Jason Shachat and Mark Walker
Additional contact information
Mark Walker: University of Arizona

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of ``hide and seek.'' Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player's role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects' play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

Keywords: Minimax; mixed strategy; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2003-12-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 29
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Journal Article: Hide and seek in Arizona (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0312001

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