BIDDING STRATEGIES OF SEQUENTIAL FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS PROGRAMMED BY EXPERIENCED BIDDERS
Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper considers bidding automata programmed by experienced subjects in sequential first price sealed bid auction experiments. These automata play against each other in computer tournaments. The risk neutral subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy of the independent private value model serves as a benchmark. The equilibrium strategy does not describe any of the heterogeneous automata programs submitted by subjects and does not always perform better than average in the tournament.
Keywords: Experimental Economics; First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions; Sequential Auctions; Independent Private Value Model; Finite Automata (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C12 C13 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 32
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0503007
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