Behaviour in a Two-Stage Two Public Goods Experiment
Massimo Finocchiaro Castro
Experimental from EconWPA
In a two-stage two-public good experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes.
Keywords: public goods; experiments; voluntary provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 H41 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0504002
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Experimental from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().