Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum Games
Pedro Rey-Biel ()
Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany
We perform a further experiment to check the robustness of the main result in Rey Biel (2005) to sequential play. We find that Equilibrium predictions work even better when the same games are played sequentially: 85% of first movers choose the Equilibrium strategy and 85% of second movers best respond to the action taken by first movers. We conclude by identifying constant sum games as a class of games where experimental subjects' choices coincide with theory predictions and we argue that in such games distributional and reciprocal preferences do not influence subjects' decisions.
Keywords: Experiments; Constant Sum Games; Best Response (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 17
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0506004
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