Equilibrium Play and Best Reply to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games
Pedro Rey-Biel ()
Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany
We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence the way subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain differences with previous work.
Keywords: Experiments; Constant; Sum; Games; Stated; Beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0512003
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().