Equilibrium Play and Best Reply to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games

Pedro Rey-Biel

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence the way subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain differences with previous work.

Keywords: Experiments; Constant; Sum; Games; Stated; Beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2005-12-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/exp/papers/0512/0512003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0512003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).