Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining

Rami Zwick (ramiz@ucr.edu), Eythan Weg and Amnon Rapoport
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Eythan Weg: Indiana University

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A basic property of any normative theory of decision making --- individual or group --- is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic equivalence is systematically violated in the behavioral arena. The present study expands the design of previous studies of bilateral bargaining by including a third party and a new trading rule - -- modifications which induce behavioral patterns that reject equivalence under subgame perfection

Keywords: bargaining; subgame perfect; invariance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 1999-03-16
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 42 ; figures: included
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Related works:
Journal Article: Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:9903002

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