Experience of Asian Asset Management Companies (AMCs): Do they Increase Moral Hazard? - Evidence from Thailand

Akiko Hagiwara (ahagiwara@adb.org) and Gloria Pasadilla

Finance from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines the performances of Asian asset management companies (AMCs). The analysis reveals that AMCs vary in their design and performance. Asset management companies can trigger moral hazard- inspired bank lending. Empirical examination of the Thai experience reveals that the moral hazard-inspired bank lending resulted in creating more new NPLs in the case of public asset management companies. Alternatively, the centralized Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC) decreases the new NPL ratio, suggesting that TAMC provokes no adverse moral hazard effect on financial institutions.

Keywords: Bank restructuring; Asset Management Company; Thailand; Moral Hazard; Asia Financial Crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2004-10-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-ifn and nep-sea
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0410001

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