Information, Investment Horizon, and Price Reactions

Anjan Thakor ()

Finance from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic investment policies of firms under asymmetric information. Managers make decisions to maximize the wealth of existing shareholders. In equilibrium, the superior firms invest 'myopically', choosing intrinsically lower-valued projects that produce 'early' cash flows. The inferior firms follow the socially preferred rule of investing in intrinsically higher-valued projects that product 'late' cash flows. In addition to explaining investment myopia, the model generates numerous predictions regarding announcement effects of equity issues and attempts by firms to stockpile cash, firms' preferences for limits on mandatory disclosure rules, and the effects of managerial entrenchment motives.

JEL-codes: G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2004-11-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information, Investment Horizon, and Price Reactions (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0411029

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