Moral Hazard, Agency Costs, and Asset Prices in a Competitive Equilibrium

Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan and Anjan Thakor ()
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Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Finance from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The behavior of economic agents in the presence of uncertainty about exogenous events and imperfect information about the endogenously influenced actions of other agents with whom they contract has been receiving growing attention. In particular, the economic theory of agency explicitly recognizes that when agents enter into synergistic relationships, each agent will act in a manner consistent with the maximization of its personal welfare, thus giving rise to a phenomenon called moral hazard.

JEL-codes: G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2004-11-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Moral Hazard, Agency Costs, and Asset Prices in a Competitive Equilibrium (1982)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0411033

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