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Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption

Joseph Halpern ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Logical characterizations of the common prior assumption (CPA) are investigated. Two approaches are considered. The first is called frame distinguishability and is similar in spirit to the approaches considered in the economics literature. Results similar to those obtained in the economics literature are proved here as well, namely, that we can distinguish finite spaces that satisfy the CPA from those that do not in terms of disagreements in expectation. However, it is shown that, for the language used here, no formulas can distinguish infinite spaces satisfying the CPA from those that do not. The second approach considered is that of finding a sound and complete axiomatization. Such an axiomatization is provided; again, the key axiom involves disagreements in expectation. The same axiom system is shown to be sound and complete both in the finite and the infinite case. Thus, the two approaches to characterizing the CPA behave quite differently in the case of infinite spaces.

Keywords: common prior assumption; agreeing to disagree; disagreement in expectation; frame distinguishability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2000-11-22
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Unix; pages: 12; figures: included
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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