Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation

Philippe Jehiel () and Dov Samet

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A valuation for a board game is an assignment of numeric values to different states of the board. The valuation reflects the desirability of the states for the player. It can be used by a player to decide on her next move during the play. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation. Valuations can also be revised, and hopefully improved, after each play of the game. Here, a very simple valuation revision is considered, in which the states of the board visited in a play are assigned the payoff obtained in the play. We show that by adopting such a learning process a player who has a winning strategy in a win-lose game can almost surely guarantee a win in a repeated game. When a player has more than two payoffs, a more elaborate learning procedure is required. We consider one that associates with each state the average payoff in the rounds in which this node was reached. When all players adopt this learning procedure, with some perturbations, then, with probability 1, strategies that are close to subgame perfect equilibrium are played after some time. A single player who adopts this procedure can guarantee only her individually rational payoff.

Keywords: reinforcement; learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2001-01-01
Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Learning To Play Games In Extensive Form By Valuation (2010)
Working Paper: Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation (2010)
Journal Article: Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation (2005)
Working Paper: Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation (2005)
Working Paper: Learning To Play Games In Extensive Form By Valuation (2001)
Working Paper: Learning To Play Games In Extensive Form By Valuation (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0012001

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