Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis
Gustav Feichtinger and
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Andreas Novak: University of Vienna
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this paper we use a differential game analysis to study the dynamic strategic interaction between a criminal gang extorting money from local shop-owners and the local police force. In particular, we are interested in characterizing which factors are important in determining whether the capital stock of local shop-owners keeps growing in spite of extortion or the criminal activity leads to a phase of stagnation of the local economy. A Markov perfect equilibrium of the game is characterized in order to address this question and several policy implications are derived to facilitate growth in regions affected by extortion.
Keywords: Extortion; Differential Games; Capital Accumulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D92 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
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Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 25; figures: included
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Journal Article: Extortion as an obstacle to economic growth: a dynamic game analysis (2002)
Working Paper: Extortion as an obstacle to economic growth: A dynamic game analysis (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0012003
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