Your Morals Are Your Moods

Georg Kirchsteiger, Luca Rigotti and Aldo Rustichini

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We test the effect of players' moods on their behavior in a gift-exchange game. In the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses a transfer to player 2. In the second stage, player 2 chooses an effort level. Higher effort is more costly for player 2, but it increases player 1's payoff. We say that player 2 reciprocates if effort is increasing in the transfer received. Player 2 is generous if an effort is incurred even when no transfer is received. Subjects play this game in two different moods. To induce a `bad mood', subjects in the role of player 2 watched a sad movie before playing the game; to induce a `good mood', they watched a funny movie. Mood induction was effective: subjects who saw the funny movie reported a significantly better mood than those who saw the sad movie. These two moods lead to significant differences in player 2's behavior. We find that a bad mood implies more reciprocity while a good mood implies more generosity. Since high transfers are relatively more common, player 1 makes more money when second movers are in a bad mood.

JEL-codes: C73 C93 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2001-02-09
Note: 32 pages, Acrobat .pdf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Your Morals Are Your Moods (2001)
Working Paper: Your Morals Are Your Moods (2001)
Working Paper: Your Morals are Your Moods (2000)
Working Paper: Your Morals are Your Moods (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0012005

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