The Algebra of Assortativity and the Evolution of Cooperation

Ted Bergstrom ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper presents an evolutionary game theoretic analysis of the dynamics of a population of prisoners' dilemma players where the probability of encountering an cooperator is higher for cooperators than for noncooperators. Examples from biological and cultural evolution are presented. There is also a discussion of voluntary matching where one's type is informatively, but imperfectly signalled.

Keywords: subliminal; extant; Smith; economagic; gmm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2001-06-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - TeX document in pdf; prepared on TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/ ; pages: 25; figures: .
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0106/0106002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0106002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).