The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

László Kóczy () and Luc Lauwers

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: For each outcome (i.e.~a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent - is employed.

Keywords: Coalition structure; core-extension; non-emptiness; dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2001-10-03, Revised 2002-06-26
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: none
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The coalition structure core is accessible (2004)
Working Paper: The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0110001

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