Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control

Atanasios Mitropoulos

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier psychologists' experiments show some tendency to convergence. Our rivalling learning rule, a modification of win-stay lose-change, does predict convergence. We perform an experiment using modern economic methodology and compare these two learning rules. Our results are unfavourable for both reinforcement learning as well as win- stay lose-change. The data rather support the view that subjects search by using patterns.

Keywords: mutual fate control; learning; coordination; experimental economics; coordination failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2001-10-18
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC - MS-Word; to print on HP A4 size; pages: 33; figures: included. revised version appeared in the Journal of Economic Psychology 22 (2001) 523-557
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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