Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach

László Kóczy ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we define and solve the accession game, a dynamic game containing a union and a set of applicants with a per-member partition function satisfying the conditions of Yi [17] to include negative externalities. The solution gives an equilibrium partition of the players as well as, after Morelli and Penelle [12], the optimal path, a subgame-perfect sequence of partitions, where each player maximises the present value of its payo.s subject to others’ moves. While this game can be applied in general our motivation was to model the ongoing extensions of the European Union.

Keywords: partition function; externalities; path dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2001-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent, nep-gth and nep-net
Note: Type of Document - AMS-LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 15; figures: none
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0111002

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