The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps

László Kóczy ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of games with nonempty cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an indirect dominance relation between them.

Keywords: dynamic cooperative game; indirect dominance; core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2002-02-04, Revised 2002-03-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: 1 - included. Work in progress, comments welcome!
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Core can be accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (2002)
Working Paper: The Core can be accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0202001

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