An Experiment on the Value of Structural Information in a 2x2 Repeated Game

Atanasios Mitropoulos

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental study shows that the provision of a small amount of structural information prior to playing the game changes subject behaviour and significantly improves performance, even though standard adaptive learning rules do not take such information into account and optimal adaptive rules do not differ much between the two treatments. Our study calls for a more intense investigation into the cognitive processing of information.

Keywords: repeated games; experiments; information; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2002-02-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pke
Note: Type of Document - MS Word 2000; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 11; figures: 5 tables included
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Journal Article: An experiment on the value of structural information in a 2 x 2 repeated game (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0202002

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