Statistical Bounds on Equity

Daniel Badagnani

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We derive the most probable distribution of resources for a simple society. We find that a probabilistic analysis forbids both too much and too less equity, and selects instead a minimally ordered state. We give the detailed calculations for a special model where the population and resources are fixed, and resources are owned only by individuals. We show that in general the equity is greater whenever the volume of the indifference manifold grows faster as a function of individual rent.

Keywords: statistics; statistical mechanics; distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2002-09-18
Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on PC/MS-DOS; to print on PostScript; pages: 6; figures: none
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0209002

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