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A bargaining approach to the consistent value for NTU games with coalition structure

Juan Vidal-Puga

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for NTU games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for pure bargaining problems with coalition structure which generalizes the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.

Keywords: NTU; consistent; bargaining; stationary; subgame; perfect; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2003-03-11
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 37 ; figures: included
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