Fictitious play in 2xn games
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Ulrich Berger: Vienna University of Economics
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
It is known that every continuous time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in every nondegenerate 2x2 and 2x3 game, and it has been conjectured that convergence to equilibrium holds generally for 2xn games. We give a simple geometric proof of this.
Keywords: Fictitious Play; Learning Process; 2xn Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
Note: Type of Document - pdf-file; pages: 11; figures: included
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303009
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