Bargaining with commitments
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected final equilibrium payoff can be defined by means of selective marginal contributions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover, for 3-player games the selective marginal contributions vectors determine the core when it is nonempty.
Keywords: demand; commitment; game; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19 ; figures: none
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Journal Article: Bargaining with commitments (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0306002
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