A Non-standard Analysis of Aumann-Shapley Random Order Values of Non-atomic Games
Lakshmi Raut ()
Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Using techniques from the non-standard analysis, a non-standard analogue of the Aumann-Shapley random order value of non-atomic games is provided. The paper introduces the notion of effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups. It is shown that for a wide class of games, the non-standard random order value with respect to an effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups coincides with the standard Aumann-Shapley value.
Keywords: Shapley Value; Random Order; Non-Atomic Games; Non-standard Analysis. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 345,395,4323247 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own. Circulated for comments and citations.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0307003
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