Credible Group Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems

Hideo Konishi and Utku Unver

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many- to-one matching problems (Blair 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise- responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any “executable” group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction, we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09-06, Revised 2005-02-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems (2006)
Working Paper: Credible Group-Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309005

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