EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

Ehud Lehrer () and Dinah Rosenberg

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers in two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided where only one player is informed.

Keywords: value of information; zero-sum; information structure; partition; Beyesian game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2003-12-11
Note: Type of Document - pdf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0312/0312005.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information? (2006) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().

 
Page updated 2018-08-19
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312005