What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?

Ehud Lehrer () and Dinah Rosenberg

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff measures the value of the particular information structure which induces it. We pose a question as to what restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information. We provide answers in two kinds of information structures: symmetric, where both players are equally informed, and one-sided where only one player is informed.

Keywords: value of information; zero-sum; information structure; partition; Beyesian game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information? (2006)
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