Forming societies and the Shapley NTU value

Juan Vidal-Puga

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We design a simple protocol of coalition formation. A society grows up by sequentially incorporating new members. The negotiations are always bilateral. We study this protocol in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. When the corresponding NTU game (N,V) satisfies that V(N) is flat, the only payoff which arises in equilibrium is the Shapley NTU value.

Keywords: Shapley NTU value; sequential formation of coalitions; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2004-01-23
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on WinXP; to print on HP; pages: 40; figures: Included
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0401003

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