Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Vincent Iehlé

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We provide a result for non-emptiness of the core in NTU games. We use a payoffs-dependent balancedness condition, based on transfer rate mappings. Going beyond the non-emptiness of standard core, existence of some refined solution is proved, including specific core allocations and equilibrium-core allocations in parameterized collection of cooperative games. The proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to various extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Core solutions; Non-emptiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C62 C71 D50 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2004-03-28
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 32
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (2007)
Working Paper: Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (2007)
Working Paper: Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (2007)
Working Paper: Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403004

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