Counting Combinatorial Choice Rules
Federico Echenique
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents- --which has positive implications for the Gale-Shapley algorithm of matching theory.
Keywords: Substitutability; Choice rules; Matching markets; Gale-Shapley Algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2004-04-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Counting combinatorial choice rules (2007) 
Working Paper: Counting Combinatoral Choice Rules (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0404004
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