Single NTU-value solutions
Emilio Calvo ()
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
We propose a variation of the Hart and Mas-Colell non-cooperative bargaining model for n-person games in coalitional form. This strategic game implements, in the limit, a new NTU-value for the class of monotonic games. This value coincides with the Maschler and Owen value for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games. The main characteristic of this proposal is that always select a unique payoff allocation. This value can also be considered as an extension of the Nash bargaining solution. Variations of this model yield extensions of the Discrete Raiffa solution, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Keywords: Shapley value; NTU-value solutions; Nash Bargaining; Raiffa solution; Kali-Smorodinsky solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2004-05-05, Revised 2004-06-10
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405004
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