Learning in Different Social Contests
Marco Novarese ()
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper aims at analysing the effects of learning on the individual behaviour in an experiment that requires cooperation and coordination within teams. Using artificial agents, different social contests are created, as training environments. The results confirm previous findings (on the tendency to repeat the strategies that proved to be successful and to apply them also in other situations) and propose new hypothesis. Learning is not only based on a mechanical repetition of past choices, but also on reflection, imitation and on the attitude to build a model of the world. Besides the paper empirically tests the role of satisfaction in the routinization (this is one of the first empirical attempt of this kind). The training in an unfair and difficult environment leads some individuals to reinforce also strategies that have not been successful, but that involved emotions. Another contest seems not to determine detectable effects.
Keywords: Learning; cognitive economics; experimental economics; cooperation; coordination; satisfaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C9 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-exp
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 22. Paper prepared for the Conference 'Cross-Fertilization Between Economics and Psychology', Sabe and Iarep joint meeting, Philadelphia, July, 2004 Session Number F1 “Cognitive Economics 1” A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at the II Conference of the Italian Association for Cognitive Economics, held in Ivrea (To), March, 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405008
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