Negotiating the membership

Juan Vidal-Puga

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In cooperative games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in his group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Cooperative game; coalition structure; Owen value; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004-09-01
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20 . pdf, a4 papersize, prepared from Scientific WorkPlace, figures included
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0409003

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