Evolution in Symmetric Incomplete Information Games
Erwin Amann and
Alex Possajennikov ()
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Erwin Amann: University of Duisburg-Essen
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric two-player games with incomplete information. One model postulates that the type of a player is fixed, and evolution works within types. In the other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of two types and two strategies it is shown that the stability properties of stationary states are the same under the two dynamics when payoffs do not depend on the type of the other player, but may differ when they do.
Keywords: incomplete information games; evolution; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0409004
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