'Strategic supplements' in games with polylinear interactions

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Strategic games are considered where: every player chooses from a compact subset of the real line; the partners' choices affect each player's utility only through their scalar aggregate, which is affine in every single partner's choice; if the choices of all players but two are fixed, then both functions expressing the dependence of one player's aggregate on the other's choice have the same slope; the best response correspondence of each player is nonempty-valued and increases in the aggregate. Every such game admits a 'Cournot potential,' i.e., Nash equilibria exist and all best response improvement paths, in a sense, lead to them.

Keywords: Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; Best response dynamics; Potential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2004-11-29, Revised 2005-02-28
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0411008

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